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ABSTRACT 
Illegal drug trafficking through West Africa has grown dramatically in the last decade, 
capturing the attention of U.S., European, and U.N. policymakers. Most countries in 
West Africa have struggled to adapt to the challenges drug trafficking has presented.  A 
few countries, like Ghana, have made a more concerted and successful effort to confront 
the problem. This thesis seeks to test the hypothesis that variations in counternarcotics 
interdiction success Ghana and Guinea-Bissau can be explained by the level of state 
capacity and the ability to absorb international counternarcotics partnerships to deal with 
the problem.  The findings of this study suggest the success of Ghana relative to Guinea-
Bissau is explained by higher level of initial state capacity and its ability to absorb 
international assistance.  The government of Guinea-Bissau, on the other hand, is caught 
in an incapacity trap that has thwarted its efforts towards narcotics interdiction.  Efforts at 
international partnership in Ghana have a foundation of state capacity to build upon and a 
viable partner whereas in Guinea-Bissau assistance efforts have been relegated to 
correcting the utter lack of capacity in an environment of political-military instability 
where a viable partner in the War on Drugs has not yet emerged.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Illegal narcotics trafficking through West Africa grew dramatically, beginning in 
2004 with cocaine seizures peaking in 2007, followed by an equally dramatic decline in 
drug seizures through 2009.1   Though seizures have fallen significantly, experts believe 
that narcotics continue to flow through West Africa and trafficking is once again 
increasing as a result of drug trafficking organizations employing different transportation 
and concealment methods.2  The shifts in West African narcotics trafficking patterns over 
the past six years have captured the attention of U.S., European, and U.N. policymakers.  
International law enforcement organizations, such as the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), as 
well as local law enforcement organizations, have adopted a number of strategies to stem 
the tide of illegal drug trafficking. The counternarcotics strategies  these organizations 
have developed are aimed at maritime interdiction of vessels inbound from Latin 
America, along with multilateral programs to build counternarcotics intelligence 
gathering capabilities and the ability to work more effectively with European law 
enforcement partners and military forces.  Other initiatives are aimed at providing 
training, equipment and personnel for airport-based counternarcotics programs to 
intercept drug mules attempting to transport drugs to Europe by commercial air travel.  
While drug trafficking activity surged and strategies were being put in place to 
ramp up the counter narcotics efforts, most countries in West Africa struggled to adapt to 
the challenges it presented.  A few countries, like Ghana, have made a concerted effort to 
confront the problem, while others, like Guinea-Bissau, have not been able to mount  
successful counternarcotics programs. Ghana’s efforts to control drug trafficking were 
recognized by U.S. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson during a 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2010. New York: United 
Nations Publications, 2010, 168–169. 
2 United Nations, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board 2010, New York: United 
Nations Publications, 2010, 48; “UN Highlights Rise of Drug Trafficking Routes Through West Africa,” 
Lisbon Lusa News Agency (Portuguese), March 2, 2011; Flemming Quist interview with author. 
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February 2010 meeting with Ghanaian President John Atta Mills.3   In contrast to Ghana, 
the U.S. Treasury Department highlighted the extremely problematic situation in Guinea-
Bissau when it designated Navy Chief of Staff, José Americo Bubo Na Tchuto, and Air 
Force Chief of Staff Ibraima Papa Camara, as drug kingpins.4  These discrepancies 
underscore the importance of researching why some countries appear to be having more 
success than others in addressing the problem of drug trafficking through West Africa. 
In the decades since President Richard Nixon famously declared war on drugs, 
billions of dollars and an immeasurable amount of human resources have been dedicated 
to counternarcotics interdiction efforts.  As the battle lines in the war on drugs have been 
drawn and redrawn, lessons have been learned regarding the effectiveness of interdiction 
methods and the best means of applying financial and human resources to control the 
problem.  The shift in drug trafficking through West Africa represents a relatively recent 
trend that presents not only tremendous challenges but also opportunities. Among the 
challenges presented is the growing nexus between drug trafficking organizations and 
terrorist groups that indicate a willingness on the part of these groups to forge alliances 
that will allow both to operate more effectively.5  Law enforcement and policymakers 
alike can benefit from in-depth analysis of the most effective approaches to interdictions 
that have been applied to the newest front in the war on drugs.  Drug traffickers have 
proven to be highly adaptable and resilient in the face of law enforcement pressure.  It is 
likely that illicit drug trafficking networks will shift routes and tactics again in the future 
and will continue to build alliances with terrorist groups as a force multiplier in response 
to increased law enforcement pressure.6  The objective of this research is to provide an 
                                                 
 3 The Ghanaian Times, “U.S. Hails Ghana’s Track Record,” Ghana Web, 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=176166. 
4 “Treasury Designates Two Narcotics Traffickers in Guinea-Bissau,” U.S. Department of Treasury 
Office of Public Affairs, Press Release, April 8, 2010. 
5 J. Peter Pham “Emerging West African Terror-Drug Nexus Poses Major Security Threat,” World 
Defense Review On-line, January 28, 2010, (Accessed March 5, 2011) 
http://worlddefensereview.com/pham012810.shtml.; Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: 
A Case Study in The Opportunism of Global Jihad,” CTC Sentinel, no. 3, issue 4, 15. 
6 Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, “Exclusive: Al Qaeda Linked to Rogue Air Network: U.S. 




analysis of counternarcotics interdiction efforts in West Africa and their relative 
successes and shortfalls in order to capture lessons learned from the variations in 
approaches to the problem.  Furthermore, the increased knowledge of the effectiveness of 
efforts within West Africa that this research aims to highlight has broader implications to 
the overall development of counter narcotics strategies. 
There is a debate in the literature on efforts to control illicit drug trafficking.  The 
policy literature argues that supply-side reduction strategies are most effective, while the 
academic literature argues for demand reduction or a combination of supply and demand 
reduction strategies.  The long-standing conventional view within policymaking circles is 
that crop eradication of coca, marijuana and poppy plants is an effective method of 
denying drug trafficking organizations the means to put drugs into the illicit trafficking 
networks.7  The success of eradication efforts has been highlighted in numerous reports, 
the most recent of which showed a drop in production in Columbia in 2008 that 
corresponded with a record level of eradication effort.8  Crop eradication is criticized by 
those outside the policy-making circles for its tremendous costs, damage to the 
environment, inability to suppress the drug supply over the long-term on a global scale 
and its failure to address the underlying political and socio-economic causes of 
                                                 
7 United State Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
“International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.” (2010), 103, 212, 508; Liana S. Wyler,  “International 
Drug Control Policy.” Congressional Research Service. 16; Maria Celia Toro, Mexico’s War on Drugs, 
Causes and Consequences, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995, 12–13; Report of the 
International Narcotics Control Board for 2009. New York: United Nations, 2009, 124–125; LaMond F. 
Tullis, and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Handbook of Research on the Illicit 
Drug Traffic : Socioeconomic and Political Consequences. New York: Greenwood, 1991, 123–127. 
 8 United State Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
“International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.” (2010), 13-14, for example reported 39 % drop in 
Columbian “potential cocaine production” between 2007 and 2008 from an estimated 490 metric tons to 
300 metric tons with a 29% percent reduction of areas under cultivation during the same period due to 
eradication efforts; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),World Drug Report 2009. New 
York: United Nations Publications, 2009, 197. 
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production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs.9 Furthermore, it is argued that 
eradication efforts increase the likelihood of human rights violations, violent response 
from insurgent groups and alliances between insurgent groups and growers.10 Felbab-
Brown notes that eradication programs require the national government of the producing 
country to provide firm military control over its entire territory, to cooperate with 
international partners in eradication efforts and to exercise sustained control populations 
that are dependent on illicit crops for their livelihoods to ensure they do not revert to 
illicit crop cultivation.  She argues that since it is very rare for all three of these 
conditions to exist in producing countries eradication programs have limited 
applicability.11  Bartilow and Kihong argue that the collateral damage such programs 
inflict in terms of destruction of the livelihoods and civil rights of innocent populations 
and the increase in drug related violence makes the cost of such strategies unacceptable in 
many cases.12  Eradication is, nevertheless, a pillar of the supply-side counterdrug 
strategies and it is argued that it can be successful by also providing alternative 
livelihoods schemes, crop substitution and rural development to preempt re-engagement 
in drug cultivation, production and trafficking.13 However, in practice, alternatives rarely 
measure up to the level of effort and funding put towards eradication.  Scholars point to 
                                                 
9 Testimony by Vanda Felbab-Brown before U.S. House of Representatives Domestic Policy 
Subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee. The Design and Resourcing of 
Supply-Side Counternarcotics Policies. 2010, 
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0414_drug_funding_felbabbrown.aspx. (Accessed 19 
April 2010); Wyler, Liana S. “International Drug Control Policy.” Congressional Research Service. 16: 
Tullis, F. LaMond, and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Handbook of Research 
on the Illicit Drug Traffic : Socioeconomic and Political Consequences. New York: Greenwood, (1991), 
123-127; Thoumi, Francisco E. Illegal Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes. Washington, D.C.; 
Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; [Distributed by] Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, 196–
199. 
10 Phillip Coffin and Jeremy Bigwood, “Coca Eradication,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 6, 7: 1-4; 
Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. “Drugs, Violence, and 
Development in Colombia: A Department-Level Analysis.” Latin American Politics and Society 48, no. 3 
(Autumn, 2006): 167, 180. 
11 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Opium Licensing in Afghanistan: Its Desirability and Feasibility,” Policy 
Paper, Brookings Institute, No. 1, August 2007, 4–5.  
12 Horace A. Bartilow,  and Kihong Eom. “Busting Drugs while Paying with Crime: The Collateral 
Damage of U.S. Drug Enforcement in Foreign Countries.” Foreign Policy Analysis 5, no. 2 (Apr, 2009): 
93–95.  
13Tullis, F. LaMond, and United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. Handbook of 
Research on the Illicit Drug Traffic : Socioeconomic and Political Consequences. New York: Greenwood, 
1991, 231–234. 
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the inability of programs designed to provide viable alternatives to illegal crop cultivation 
and its lack of focus on the underlying economic problems as critical shortfalls of 
strategies that rely heavily on the supply-side dynamics of the drug trade.14  Ironically, 
such programs while very well funded annually, do little to alleviate the burden that law 
enforcement faces in its attempts to interdict because overall levels of drugs in the 
supply-chain stabilize over time largely due to “balloon effect.”15  However, this debate 
is largely irrelevant to West Africa, which has virtually no supply of locally cultivated 
cocaine and a limited demand for the narcotics that transit the region.16 
Interdiction, which is relevant to West Africa, is another key element of supply-
side narcotics control strategy, which faces criticism for its limited effectiveness. The 
U.S. State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report weighs in on the 
positive aspects of interdiction: “Successful targeting and interdiction of drug smuggling 
threats create a deterrent effect. Interdiction success causes Drug Trafficking 
Organizations (DTOs) to incur greater costs and decreased efficiency in moving their 
illicit product to market.”17  Countering this, Fowler argues that “interdiction is unlikely 
to be effective as a strategy to ‘win’ the Global War on Drugs, if ‘winning’ means that 
drug suppliers are significantly reduced on a long-term basis, and with them, the number 
                                                 
14 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Trouble Ahead: The Cocaleros of Peru.” Current History 105, no. 688 (Feb, 
2006): 79–83 
15Senlis Council. Impact Assessment of Crop Eradication in Afghanistan and Lessons Learned from 
Latin America and South East Asia. London: MF Publishing Ltd, 2006, 23. This report notes: “A further 
unintended consequence of eradication is often described as the “balloon effect,” involving the 
displacement of illegal production to more remote areas, where it is more difficult, to extirpate.” The 
definition of balloon effect, has been extended by some scholars to include conditions in which law 
enforcement efficacy at squeezing the balloon leads traffickers to shift their trafficking to routes with less 
law enforcement resistance.   
16 Ghana is a cultivator of cannabis that is mostly for local consumption as are several West African 
nations.  Local demand for cocaine is growing, but still represents a miniscule market by comparison to the 
European consumer market, which is the ultimate destination for the majority of West African trafficked 
cocaine.  
17 United States. Dept. of State. Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. and United States. Bureau 
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report.” (2010), 48.  
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of drug users and the power of the international drug cartels.”18  By using dynamic 
modeling, he makes the case that interdiction is ineffective due to inelasticity of demand 
for drugs.  His contention is that supply may be temporarily interrupted by interdiction 
and prices may increase slightly in the short-term, but drug cartels are not hurt to the 
degree policy-makers believe, and the more important drug trafficking node to hit is the 
drug trafficker’s source of capital.19 Other scholars, such as Rodriguez-Beruff and 
Cordero, have also weighed in on this side of the debate from the context of the 
Caribbean drug transit zone.  In underscoring the problems associated with a developing 
a successful interdiction strategy, they note that at “its most extreme this would involve 
the impossible task of building a ‘Caribbean barrier’ against illicit drugs, using police and 
military controls…This overlooks the complexities of the region, as well as those of the 
drug trade.”20  Youngers and Rosin also point to the shortfall in demand reduction 
efforts, democratic development, and aid programs that are more likely to have a long-
term impact on the underlying problems higher on the counter drug agenda than the 
purely repressive measures that garner short-term successes.21 Policymakers, on the other 
hand take an enforcement first approach “to combating the corrosive impact of drug trade 
on societies.”22 Not surprisingly, those in this camp point to the relative success of bi-
lateral interdiction efforts such as the 2007 joint operation between the U.S. Coast Guard 
and the Panamanian Government that led to the largest drug seizure in U.S. history.  On 
balance, policymakers concede that much more still needs to be done both within the law 
enforcement arena by improving coordinated interdiction efforts, as well as improving 
the rule of law and building capacity while also instituting economic development 
                                                 
18 Thomas B. Fowler, “The International Narcotics Trade:  Can It Be Stopped By Interdiction,” 
Journal of Policy Modeling, 18, no. 3, (1996): 262; Van de Velde, “The Growth of Criminal Organizations 
and Insurgent Groups Abroad due to International Drug Trafficking,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law 
Enforcement, 5, no. 3, (Winter 1996): 467. 
19 Fowler, “The International Narcotics Trade,” 234, 262.   
20 Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America : The Impact of U.S. 
Policy. Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner, 2005, 303. 
21 Youngers and Rosin, Drugs and Democracy, 340–341.  
22 Colleen W. Cook, Congressional Research Service, Mexico's Drug Cartels, [Washington, D.C.]: 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2007, 20. 
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programs in the effected country.23 Interdiction efforts in Mexico and transit countries of 
the Caribbean, for example, have both been highlighted by the GAO as successful law 
enforcement partnerships, but these reports readily admit that interdiction initiatives are 
in some cases falling far short of expectations, and there is still great deal of room for 
improvements across nearly all measures of effectiveness.24  Although, Felbab-Brown 
has criticized eradication, she weighs in cautiously on the side of interdiction when it is 
sequenced properly in combination with other strategies, such as alternative livelihood 
and licensing programs.  She notes interdiction is important “…to allow the state to 
prevent crime organizations from accumulating excessive power and threatening a 
country’s security, political integrity and the rule of law.”25  But, she also warns that 
interdiction, like eradication, simply causes traffickers to seek an alternative path of least 
resistance in a weaker state with less effective law enforcement pressure and more remote 
unmonitored spaces to operate in, and thus is unlikely to actually reduce the drug flow.26  
Because the policy debate remains at a very high-level of analysis, it generally 
does not consider the actual effectiveness of specific law enforcement efforts in particular 
contexts.  The Government Accountability Office conducted a comprehensive study of 
counternarcotics efforts in eight drug transit zone countries during 2008 and noted “the 
effect of particular initiatives is often unclear, making it difficult to assess progress in 
                                                 
23 Cook,  Mexico's Drug Cartels; United States. Government Accountability Office, “Drug Control 
U.S. Assistance has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow 
into the United States : Report to Congressional Requesters.” U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. 
24 United States. Government Accountability Office, “Drug Control U.S. Assistance has Helped,” 17-
18.; Statement by Jess T. Ford, Director of International Affairs and Trade notes that “the White House 
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) released a summary of a Southwest Border Strategy aimed at 
disrupting the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S., and cited recent cooperation as leading to substantial 
disruption of illegal drug flow into the United States.” Contradicting this, the same report notes: “DTOs 
operate with relative impunity in certain regions of Mexico, including areas along the U.S. Mexican 
border.”; “Drug Control U.S. Assistance has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit 
Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States : Report to Congressional Requesters.” U.S. Govt. 
Accountability Office, 1–3. 
25 Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up : Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010, 156–157; 177. 
26 Testimony by Vanda Felbab-Brown before U.S. House of Representatives Domestic Policy 
Subcommittee of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee. The Design and Resourcing of 
Supply-Side Counternarcotics Policies. 2010, 
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0414_drug_funding_felbabbrown.aspx. (Accessed 19 April 
2010). 
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achieving agency goals, compare the relative effectiveness of their initiatives and make 
results-based decisions concerning resource allocations.”27 The report does identify three 
conditions that hinder the effectiveness of interdiction efforts in the Caribbean transit 
zone: a transit country’s limited ability to sustain a counternarcotics program with the 
necessary funds, limited political support, and corruption.28 Nevertheless, the GAO 
cautiously hails the relative progress of counternarcotics efforts in the Caribbean.  
However, others argue that these efforts are simply “squeezing the balloon,” forcing the 
highly adaptable drug trafficker to shift their trafficking routes to locations where there is 
less law enforcement pressure.29   Many of the same elements that hinder drug 
interdiction in the Caribbean, according to the GAO report, such as limited ability to 
sustain counternarcotics operations, are present in many West African countries.  As with 
the Caribbean zone, the balloon effect of higher levels of law enforcement effectiveness 
in the European consuming countries has created a niche for cocaine transshipment 
through West Africa where the risk of interdiction is much lower than attempting to reach 
Europe directly.  
Like the Caribbean connection to North America, West Africa has recently grown 
into a lucrative transit point for narcotics destined for the burgeoning European cocaine 
consuming market.  However, West Africa as a transit hub and the roles domestic and 
international efforts have played in addressing the problem has been much less well 
studied than the major transit countries that connect the Latin American cocaine suppliers 
                                                 
27 The eight countries studied by the GAO were:  The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama and Venezuela.  United States, Government Accountability Office, 
“Drug Control Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries has Improved, but Better 
Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans are Needed : Report to Congressional Requesters.” U.S. 
Govt. Accountability Office, 2008, 4. 
28 United States, Government Accountability Office, “Drug Control Cooperation with Many Major 
Drug Transit Countries,” 4-5.  Transit zone countries were unable to fund fuel and maintain boats for 
maritime interdiction, Venezuela has ceased cooperation with U.S. counternarcotics programs in 2005,  and 
other countries have undermined international operations due to law enforcement corruption.  
29 Liana S. Wyler,  “International Drug Control Policy,” [Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, March 8, 2010, 27. 
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to the United States.30  This is largely because the rise of West Africa as a major cocaine 
transit hub is recent, as are the interdiction efforts to respond to the problem.   A 
preliminary look at West Africa suggests that counternarcotics efforts have faced similar 
problems to those noted by the Government Accountability Office in its reports on the 
Caribbean.  As West African narcotics seizure patterns went through cycles of surging 
then appearing to decline sharply as traffickers shifted tactics in response to law 
enforcement pressures, research has not kept pace with what law enforcement’s role has 
been. This research effort seeks to fill this gap by explaining variations in the 
counternarcotics interdiction programs in two West African nations that have been 
profoundly affected by the surge in transshipment activities.  
This thesis analyzes variations in drug interdiction patterns within West Africa.  It 
argues that successful counter drug trafficking in West Africa has been dependent upon a 
sound domestic interdiction strategy, significant degree of international partnerships, and 
most importantly enough state capacity, including law enforcement, the judicial system, 
and the administrative apparatus, to ensure that strategy is translated into interdiction 
success.  More specifically, the hypothesis of this research is that variations in 
counternarcotics interdiction success in Ghana and Guinea-Bissau are explained by 
Ghana’s higher initial level of state capacity, which allowed it to absorb international 
counternarcotics assistance effectively while Guinea-Bissau’s lower initial level of state 
capacity prevented it from doing so. 
The thesis will use a comparative case study method to study interdiction efforts 
in two of the main north and south entry points within West Africa, Ghana and Guinea-
Bissau.  Both countries are similarly situated geographically in a zone that provides 
ample opportunities for drug traffickers to operate clandestinely using a variety of 
maritime, commercial airline and over land trafficking methods.  Furthermore, each 
country has limited resources, skills and personnel to apply in confronting the challenges 
of being a drug transit zone.  However, Ghana has had more success than Guinea-Bissau.  
                                                 
30 The Government Accountability Office has produced a comprehensive study of trafficking transit 
countries linking Latin America to the United States. “Drug Control Cooperation with Many Major Drug 
Transit Countries has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans are Needed:  
Report to Congressional Requesters.” U.S. Government. Accountability Office, 2008.  
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The independent variable (IV) is the capacity of the state, the intervening variable 
the effectiveness of bilateral or multilateral counternarcotics assistance programs 
involving domestic and international agencies, and the dependent variable the level of 
interdiction success.  One would expect to see a noticeable increase in drug seizures as 
assistance from international partners increases, but only where initial state capacity is 
sufficient to absorb this assistance.  State capacity is measured by the World Bank 
Country Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Quality of Public 
Administration indicator, which measures, “the extent to which civilian government is 
structured to design and implement government policy and deliver services 
effectively.”31 Effectiveness of international partnerships, training and resources is 
measured by number of seizures before and after the initialization of an international 
partnership.  Valid measures of the dependent variable are more problematic, as 
systematic narcotics trafficking data is limited. This study will use arrests/seizures in 
country (Ghana or Guinea-Bissau) as a percentage of all known arrests/seizures of drugs 
emanating from the country using the United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) biannual narcotics seizure reports.  Where possible, data is provided in terms 
of number of seizures, arrests and weight.  The primary measure of the (DV) is cocaine 
arrests/seizures, as this is the most reliable source of the surge in trafficking between 
2005 and 2007.  Heroin and cannabis will be considered in the overall narcotics seizure 
data analysis, but will not be individually analyzed. 
 
                                                 
31 Definition from the World Bank Development Indicators, found under data.  The Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment “is a diagnostic tool that is intended to capture the quality of a country’s 
policies and institutional arrangements—i.e. its focus is on the key elements that are within the country’s 
control.” The CPIA Quality of Public Administration measure is one of 16 Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment Indicators that falls under the Public Sector Management and Institutions cluster 
http://go.worldbank.org/EEAIU81ZG. (Accessed January 21, 2011). 
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II. GHANA  
This chapter will advance the argument that Ghana’s higher initial level of 
institutional capacity has allowed it to be relatively more successful in absorbing 
international drug interdiction assistance and thus in counternarcotics interdiction. This 
chapter will first look at interdiction as the measure of the dependent variable. The 
impact of the independent variable of state capacity upon interdiction as measured by the 
World Bank Country Performance Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Quality of Public 
Administration indicators will then be discussed followed by international partnerships. 
A. NARCOTICS INTERDICTION GHANA 
Cocaine, cannabis, and heroin trafficking through the country began to grow 
exponentially starting in 2004–2005..32   Ghanaian law enforcement had a landmark year 
arresting suspects for drug related offenses in 2004.33  This included the largest drug 
seizure in West Africa up to that point, on January 7, 2004. The Narcotics Control Board 
(NACOB) and the Ghana Police Services (GPS) Drug Enforcement Unit, acted on a tip 
from British intelligence, seized 588 kilos of cocaine in the port city of Tema and arrested 
                                                 
32 Trafficking is not a new phenomena in Ghana. Cannabis cultivation and trafficking has been going 
on in Ghana dating back to the post-WWII era, particularly during times of economic crisis and continues 
to the present.  Heroin and cocaine became part of the West African narcotics trafficking portfolio in the 
late 1980s as direct commercial flights were established between Ghana and Europe and law enforcement 
pressures were increasing on the commercial airline trafficking routes between Southeast Asia and Europe.  
The recent surge of cocaine trafficking through West Africa as a transshipment point was detected around 
2004, when a combination of market forces due to higher demand and price for cocaine in Europe relative 
to the decline in the North American market, as well as increased North American law enforcement 
pressure. For early historical background and impact of Ghanaian Diaspora see: Emmanuel Akyeampong, 
“Diaspora and Drug Trafficking in West Africa: A Case Study of Ghana.” African Affairs 104, no. 416 
(Jul., 2005): 429-447.  For the roots of cocaine and heroin trafficking see: Henry Bernstein, “Ghana's Drug 
Economy: Some Preliminary Data.” Review of African Political Economy 26, no. 79; Africa and the Drugs 
Trade (Mar., 1999): 13-32.  For an explanation of the shift in trafficking patterns see: United Nations 
Office on Drug and Crime, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, report prepared by the 
Studies and Threat Analysis Section and the Regional Office for Western and Central Africa of UNODC, 
November 2008, 8–10. 
33 The U.S. State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2005 indicates 
“Overall, saw the highest number of drug trafficking arrests on record.”  Further noting that between 
January and September of 2004, 705 drug related arrests were made nationwide in Ghana.  This data is 
problematic because it does not indicate how many arrests were made interdicting traffickers and how 
many were part of NACOB’s demand reduction/deterrence measures aimed at users.  Also, the INCSR for 
2003  does not innumerate the number of arrests nor the quantities of drugs seized, so it’s impossible to 
know the magnitude of the improvement over the previous years. 
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six suspects.34  The suspects were later convicted and sentenced to long prison terms. 
Overall, however, Ghana was unsuccessful at reducing drug trafficking in 2004 (Figure 
1).  Latin American drug traffickers were increasing the flow of cocaine through Ghana 
to Europe using  mules travelling through Accra’s Kotoka International Airport (KIA), 
air cargo, postal shipments and over-land routes through neighboring countries.  Figure 1 
shows that only 5.6% of the drug cases of Ghanaian origin reported to the UNODC were 
stopped by domestic law enforcement officials in Ghana while the remaining 94.4% were 
made by foreign officials in destination countries.35 
 
                                                 
34 U.S. Dept. of State, INCSR, 2005, 536; Note: the following article lists the quantity seized as 674 
kilograms rather than the INCSR figure of 588. “Biggest Cocaine Bust in Africa, Happens at Tema,” 
Ghanaweb, January 7, 2004: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=49444. 
(Accessed January 16, 2011).  
35 In terms of the total numbers, 14 of the 252 drug seizure cases of Ghanaian origin that were reported 
to the UNODC were interdicted in Ghana whereas the remainder were reported  as primarily in the United 
Kingdom.  These seizures were reported in updates to biannual seizure reports through 2006.  See: United 
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement Section, 
Bi-Annual Seizure Reports 2004/1- 2006/2: Summary of Individual Significant Seizures of Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances, as Reported by Governments, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime.  
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Figure 1.   Ghanaian Drug Cases Seized Domestically Vs. Foreign36 
However,  in 2005 local interdiction improved dramatically, with 94.8% of the 
reported cases of Ghanaian origin were stopped domestically and only 5.2% in 
destination countries. In 2005, Ghanaian law enforcement stopped 73 individual cases 
leading to the arrest of 82 suspects.  65 of these cases occurred at Kotoka International 
Airport against only 12 cases interdicted at KIA the previous year.37  
                                                 
36 Comparison of known seizures of Ghanaian origin made domestically vs. those reportedly made in 
foreign countries based on multiple reports from: United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime 
Prevention, Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement Section, Bi-Annual Seizure Reports 2004/1 through 
2010/1: Summary of Individual Significant Seizures of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, as 
Reported by Governments, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004-2010.  Additional 
drug seizure statistics for the period 2006-2010 provided by the DEA, Accra, Ghana.  The figure for 2010 
is based on preliminary data from UNODC Bi-Annual Seizure Report 2010/1 and Operation Westbridge 
data sheets provided by DEA, Accra, Ghana.  
37 Comparison of UNODC, Bi-Annual Drug Seizure Reports, 2005-1, 2005-2 and updates to 2005-1 
published in the first report of 2006. 
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In 2006, Ghana again had one of the largest drug seizures in West Africa up to 
that point: 1,900 kilograms, seized in the small fishing village of Phrampram.38  This 
large drug seizure owes more to happenstance than a systematic coastal counternarcotics 
operation.  This is an often cited criticism of African interdiction operations because very 
few coastal interdiction efforts were systematically being carried out. On the other hand, 
beyond this large seizure, Ghana was beginning to establish a pattern of interdicting 
narcotics.  In 2006, 79.5% of the drug trafficking cases of Ghanaian origin reported to the 
UNODC in 2006 were stopped domestically against 20.5% that were made outside 
Ghana.39  The lower interdiction rate in 2006 compared to the previous year was due to a 
combination of traffickers adjusting their modus operandi based on increased airport 
security measures, using a variety of transportation methods along with the extremely 
high volumes of cocaine that was being moved through the region. 2006 corresponded to 
one of the two largest surge years in cocaine trafficking through West African by 
comparison to the previous years.40   
The interdiction success rate in 2007 dropped significantly, with only 42.7% of 
cases successfully interdicted in Ghana.41  Given the rebound in success after 2007, it 
seems most likely that the 2007 dip was caused by the continuing surge in cocaine 
trafficking that year.  Of the 80 metric tons of cocaine seized in European destinations in 
2007, 34%, or an estimated 27 metric tons, were of African origin.42   2007 was also the  
 
 
                                                 
38 UNODC, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa, Published by UNODC Studies and 
Threat Analysis Section and Regional Office for West and Central Africa, November 2008, 12. 
39 This equates to a total number of drug seizures for 2006 of 58 with 15 cases of known Ghanaian 
origin interdicted outside the country. UNODC, Bi-Annual Drug Seizure Report, 2006-1 through 2007-1 (to 
include updates to previous reporting periods). 
40 More than 14 tons of cocaine of West African origin was seized in 2006, eclipsing the totals for all 
other years. See: UNODC, World Drug Report 2010. New York: United Nations Publications, 2010, 168–
169. 
41 The number of suspect apprehended at KIA, did, in fact increase from 40 suspects to 70 after the 
introduction of Operation Westbridge, but overall the percentage of cases interdicted in Ghana dropped 
relative to those cased interdicted elsewhere.  
42 Data provided from this source analyzed the region and the continent as a whole but was not 
country specific.  See:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2010. New York: 
United Nations Publications, 2010 167–169. 
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peak year for the highest percentage of drug mules of West African origin detected in 
Europe. In the second quarter of 2007, 59% of all couriers apprehended in European 
airports, came from West African airports.43  
In 2008, the domestic interdiction rate improved  to 75%, and remained consistent 
thereafter (72.2% in 2009 and 74.2% in 2010).44  In each of these years, Ghanaian law 
enforcement authorities made large drug busts.  For example, in May 2008, Ghana Police 
Services seized 399 kilograms of cocaine through surveillance of a vehicle outside of 
Accra, resulting in the arrest and conviction of three suspects, who each received long 
prison sentences.45  Despite the dip in 2007, the average domestic interdiction rate for 
2005-2010  was 73%. 
B. STATE CAPACITY 
Since 2005, Ghana has scored 3.5 out of 6 on the World Bank’s Quality of Public 
Administration variables, significantly better than Guinea-Bissau’s 2.5 and slightly better 
than the ECOWAS average of 3.0.46   This allowed law enforcement in Ghana to make a 
positive impact against narcotics trafficking over the past five years, despite the 
involvement of high-level police officials in trafficking, as well as manpower and 
funding shortages.  Relatively high state capacity has impacted interdiction mostly 
through better than average accountability. 
The case of the Maritime Vessel Benjamin is illustrative.  Despite the fact that 
NACOB and GPS officials had intelligence about the vessel’s cargo and its impending 
arrival, 2300 kilograms of cocaine were offloaded from the vessel at Tema on April 26, 
2006.  Only the 30 kilos that remained on board the MV Benjamin were seized and later 
                                                 
43 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Crime and Instability: Case Studies of Transnational 
Threats,” Report by Studies and Threat Analysis Section, Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, 
February 2010,  Figure 12, 17. 
44 UNODC Bi-Annual Seizure Reports 2008/1 through 2010/1.  Note that the data for 2010 is an 
estimate based on the UNODC report for the first half of 2010 and seizures reported by Operation 
Westbridge. 
45 Mabel Aku Beneseh, “3 Jailed Over Cocaine,” The Daily Graphic (Ghana), July 10, 2010. 
46 World Bank, CPIA Quality of Public Administration Rating, under data, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.PADM.XQ (Accessed January 21, 2011). 
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used as evidence, and five of those 30 later disappeared from police custody.47 The 
remaining seventy-six parcels of cocaine were transported to an unknown location and 
were never recovered.  On the surface, this shows that Ghana suffers from the same 
corruption and collusion with drug trafficking that has been an obstacle to effect 
interdiction in Guinea-Bissau (chapter three).  However, the state’s response to the MV 
Benjamin events shows the fact and impact of its greater capacity.  In April 2006 five 
suspects including the owner of the vessel a second crew member and three Ghanaians 
were arrested for their involvement in transporting the cocaine from the MV Benjamin 
into Ghana.  After a lengthy trial the five accused traffickers were convicted based on the 
remaining evidence and the testimony of thirteen prosecution witnesses, demonstrating 
judicial capacity to investigate and prosecute cases.48  Three Ghanaian policemen who 
were involved in the disappearance of the cocaine once it was smuggled into the country 
were also convicted and sent to prison.49  Additionally, two NACOB officials were 
suspended for dereliction of duty as a result of the missing evidence, and the NACOB 
Executive Secretary was ultimately relieved of duty, indicating capacity to sanction 
corrupt and/or incompetent officials. Furthermore, a committee chaired by Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Georgina Wood was convened to investigate the facts surrounding 
MV Benjamin case and the allegations of official involvement, demonstrating rule of 
law.50 
These events stimulated a series of investigations and house cleaning efforts 
within the Ghana Police Services in 2007. Between April and October, 88 GPS officers 
were arrested and dismissed in a variety of cases involving official misconduct, 
corruption and attempts to sell confiscated narcotics or “retrieve parcels of cocaine along 
Ghana’s coast near Takoradi.”51  In 2008 Ghanaian law enforcement continued to 
                                                 
47 U.S. Department of State, INCSR, 2007, 532. 
48 Stephen K. Effah, “125 YRS FOR 5 COKE DEALERS...In M.V. Benjamin Case” The Ghanaian 
Times, July 28, 2008 http://www.modernghana.com/news/176160/1/125-yrs-for-5-coke-dealersin-mv-
benjamin-case.html. (Accessed January 17, 2011). 
49 U.S. Dept. of State, INCSR, 2009, 277. 
50 Georgina Wood Committee Report, Ghana Ministry of Justice, September 2006, 8 
http://www.mint.gov.gh/dmdocuments/geogina_wood_committee_report.pdf. (Accessed January 19, 2011). 
51 U.S. Dept. of State, INCSR, 2008, 563. 
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increase its interdiction capacity by re-structuring, expanding and replacing the top 
leadership.  NACOB recruited new personnel bringing it to approximately 173 agents, 
decentralized its operations into specialty areas (such as demand reduction and 
enforcement), expanded outside its base in Accra to Tamale, Kumasi and Takoradi, and 
provided agents to assist with Operation Westbridge at Kotoka International Airport (see 
below).52 In July 2009, newly-elected President John Atta Mills replaced the governing 
board of NACOB and appointed Yaw Akrasi Sarpong as the Executive Secretary to bring 
more credibility to the agency.   To reduce incentives for corruption and collusion with 
drug trafficking, GPS increased officers’salaries, which were previously among the 
lowest in the civil service.53   
In 2010, the GPS also rolled out a five-year strategic policing plan. The plan 
acknowledges that GPS like many of its African counter parts is resource constrained in 
personnel, equipment and training facilities.  For example, as of 2008, GPS only had 
1433 vehicles to serve 960 stations and posts across the country with 21% of the vehicles 
broken down leaving approximately one vehicle per post.54  Though GPS has a National 
Police Training School, it does not have enough training capacity to indoctrinate the new 
recruits it hopes to add under the plan and it also lacks a training facility dedicated to a 
Criminal Investigation Division (CID).  In assessing Ghanaian law enforcement capacity, 
a senior law enforcement official with the UNODC acknowledged that equipment and 
training levels of Ghanaian police are low but further stated that “taken in the African 
context Ghana’s capacity is reasonable. In fact, they are in the top level in terms of 
                                                 
52 Emmanuel Bonney, “Shake-Up At NACOB,” The Daily Graphic (Ghana), June 27, 2008, 
http://www.modernghana.com/news/171985/1/shake-up-at-nacob.html. (Accessed January 19, 2011); 
NACOB personnel numbers: See (INCSR): Volume I Drug and Chemical Control, United States 
Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 2010, 297. 
53 “The Police Benefit From Single Spine Salary Structure,” Press Release, August 3, 2010, Ghana 
Government Official Portal, 
http://ghana.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2889:the-police-benefit-from-
single-spine-salary-structure&catid=28:general-news&Itemid=162. (Accessed February 16, 2011). 
54 Ghana Police Service Five-Year Strategic National Policing Plan 2010-2014. Among the goals of 
the plan is to expand the force by 16,000 officers over course of 2010-2014.   The previous strategic action 
plan in 2005 resulted in the growth of the force from 17,000 to its current level of 23,000. 
http://www.ghanapolice.info/Gps_five-yr_strategic_plan.pdf. (Accessed February 16, 2011).. 
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capacity relative to other West African countries.”55  The five-year plan is aimed at 
improving the shortfalls in equipment such as vehicles along with information technology 
equipment, professional development, recruitment, training and infrastructure 
improvements to better support its officers.  In addition to meeting the material and 
manpower requirements, an overarching goal of the plan is to restore its credibility in the 
wake of the MV Benjamin scandal.56   
C. INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
This ability of NACOB and GPS to critically assess and address  organizational 
weaknesses reflects the relatively high level of preexisting institutional capacity, and had 
a direct effect on interdiction effectiveness but also allowed the Ghanaian state to absorb 
international assistance, leading to even more interdiction effectiveness.57   This 
international assistance has taken the form of many different programs such as: ICITAP 
training, drug surveillance equipment, Operation Westbridge, JPCU, and evidence 
storage facilities and prosecutorial capacity building programs.  
In 2003, the United States government installed drug detection “itemizers” for 
counternarcotics surveillance operations at Kotoka International Airport.58  Additionally, 
multiple agencies of Ghanaian law enforcement received training in two two-week 
courses in airport and seaport counternarcotics interdiction techniques through the United 
States Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program (ICITAP) in November 2004.59  This contributed to improving upon Ghanaian 
                                                 
55 Flemming Quist, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, UNODC, Interview with author. 
56 GPS Five-Year Strategic Plan, 17  
57 The judicial and legislative sectors demonstrate similar levels of institutional capacity, which may 
serve to deter drug trafficking.  An average of 40 drug trafficking cases have been successfully prosecuted 
annually since 2001 (based on U.S. Department of State data), while the  legislature acted in 2007 to make 
it more difficult for narcotics traffickers to be granted bail and flee the country prior to prosecution.  U.S. 
Dept. of State INCRS, 2004-2010; 2008, 565. 
58 INCSR, 2005, 536. 
59 The U.S. State Department provided funding for a U.S. Department of Justice, International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).  This provided a “train-the-trainer” program 
for 30 officers of the Narcotics Control Board, Ghana Police Services, Immigration Service, Customs 
Excise Protective Service and Civil Aviation Authority on maritime and airport drug interdiction.  See:  
United States Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2005, 536. 
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law enforcement’s interdiction capacity.  Though these were “train-the-trainer” programs 
and did not involve direct assistance to counternarcotics operations, it provided 30 
officers crucial knowledge about counternarcotics operations thus giving officers the 
ability to pass this knowledge on.60  Ghana’s initial state capacity allowed law 
enforcement to absorb the train-the-trainer programs and to employ the drug itemizers 
and adjust to the changing demands of the interdiction.61  By examining Table 1 on page 
21 there is a noticeable increase in drug seizures at Kotoka international airport beginning 
in 2005 following the training, technical assistance and equipment described above that 
was provided in 2003-2004. 
In response to the demonstrated ability of the Ghanaian state to effectively absorb 
international drug interdiction assistance in the past, and growing concern about the 
volume of drug trafficking through the region, Ghana and the UK launched “Operation 
Westbridge” in November 2006. The program was initiated at the request of the 
Government of Ghana and was designed to station British customs officers alongside 
their Ghanaian counterparts in Kotoka International Airport to train and mentor Ghanaian 
customs officers on counternarcotics detection and intelligence techniques.62  Without the 
ability to enter into a partnership with trained, capable Ghanaian law enforcement 
personnel along with the infrastructure within Kotoka International Airport to support the 
program, it would not have gotten off the ground.63 
                                                 
60 INCSR, 2005, 536. 
61 Operation Westbridge did not start until the Fall of 2006 and the Joint Port Control Unit under the 
UNODC/World Customs Organization Global Container Control Program started in 2008. 
62 Operation Westbridge is a U.K. led joint counternarcotics interdiction, through the U.K. Ministry of 
Justice and H.M. Revenue & Customs. The operation based in Kotoka International Airport provides 
training and a cadre of British law enforcement officers rotating in and out of Ghana.  In addition to the 
benefits of interdiction before narcotics reach the U.K. an advantage to this operation is that the costs are 
offset by reducing the need to prosecute and imprison offenders in the U.K., See for example, Aning, 
Kwesi Dr., and Dr. A. Sarjoh Bah, “ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa:  Confronting the 
Triple Threat,” Center on International Cooperation, NYU; and Steven Shukor, “UK Joins Ghana in War 
on Smugglers,” BBC online, November 21, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/london/7105859.stm (Accessed January 18, 2011). 
63 Operation Westbridge Factsheet, provided to author by the Drug Enforcement Agency, Accra, 
Ghana indicates that in its first two months of operation in the fall of 2006, the program led to arrest of 12 
suspects at KIA and the seizure of 24 kilograms of cocaine, of 2,048 kilograms seized in 2006. 
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When this program was initiated, evidence suggested that when British law 
enforcement officials were absent, interdiction rates at KIA declined.  British law 
enforcement officials were stationed on a rotational basis with their Ghanaian 
counterparts, which left gaps in British oversight during change-over of personnel. 
Interdiction success fell dramatically during the gaps in coverage from one British crew 
to the next. For example, during the period of July 15, 2007 and September 17, 2007, 
Ghanaian law enforcement did not register any drug seizures while operatives in the U.K. 
registered narcotics 36 seizures of Ghanaian origin.  One sees a similar pattern before the 
Christmas holidays in 2007 when Ghanaian drug seizures stopped. This is likely due to 
the absence of British operatives who were rotating out or on holiday and did not provide 
oversight during these periods.   This suggests that though Ghanaian law enforcement 
officials had received training and international assistance in the past, in the first year of 
Westbridge, Ghana was not absorbing international assistance to increase its own 
interdiction capability, but simply providing a platform for British officials to interdict in 
Ghana.64    As was the case with earlier donations of atomizers and train the trainer 
programs, there was a lag time before the Ghanaian institutions were able to effectively 
absorb the assistance provided.  However, by 2008 Operation Westbridge found its feet 
and the domestic interdiction rate rebounded to 75%.  Since 2006, Operation Westbridge 
has netted a total of 965 kilograms of cocaine at Kotoka International Airport  (Table 1). 
Pre-Operation Westbridge Operation Westbridge (Nov 2006-2010) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
13 65 40 74* 105 73 50 
Table 1.   Drug Seizures at KIA before/after Westbridge65 
                                                 
64 This trend of drops in Ghanaian success rate during the absence of British personnel was confirmed 
by a source with knowledge of Westbridge operations that wished to remain anonymous. 
65 Figures represent the consolidation of UNODC Bi-Annual Seizure reports for each period and the 
Operation Westbridge Drug seizure factsheet. *The figure of 74 includes 12 seizures made in Nov-Dec 
2006.  The decline in seizures beginning in 2009 is reflective of the trend seen throughout the region. 
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Ghana had an established record of successful interdiction using its own law 
enforcement capabilities and technical assistance training from the U.S. prior to the 
inauguration of Operation Westbridge in November 2006.  Beginning in 2007, however, 
there was also clearly an increase in the overall number of drug seizures at KIA 
indicating that the introduction of Operation Westbridge has had an intervening causal 
affect on state capacity to interdict narcotics.  This program has only succeeded, however, 
when capable Ghanaian law enforcement officials have been committed to its success. As 
senior law enforcement advisor of the UNODC stated, “Ghana is quite well trusted by the 
international partners.  Typically, it is the U.K. and the U.S. that are involved in 
operations and both trust their Ghanaian counterparts.  The Ghanaian law enforcement 
officials who are involved in these operations are relatively easy to cooperate and 
coordinate with.”66 
Ghanaian law enforcement also has had limited interdiction success as a result of 
a Joint Port Control Unit under the UNODC/World Customs Organization Global 
Container Control Program at the port of Tema inaugurated in October 2008. The 
program is led by the Ghana Narcotics Control board as an interagency effort that 
combines the efforts of Ghanaian police with the Bureau of National Investigation, 
customs officials and the Ghana Ports and Harbors Authority.  Prior to the establishment 
of the JPCU, Ghanaian law enforcement had negligible maritime interdiction capabilities. 
This program involved UNODC and World Customs Organization as the lead officials 
providing Ghanaian law enforcement officials training on investigative and profiling 
techniques to recognize risk indicators on incoming shipments.  Table 2  shows the 
narcotics interdictions that have resulted from the JPCU program.   The decline in JPCU 
seizures from 2009 to 2010 is most likely the result of the overall downward trends in 
seizures across the region that was noticeable after the peak of seizures in 2006 and the 
increasing use of alternate means of transportation, such as specially equipped aircraft 
flying into remote landing strips in locations such as Guinea-Bissau and the Sahel region 
to avoid detection.  
                                                 
66 Flemming Quist, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor, UNODC, Interview, September 8, 2010. 
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Before Joint Port Control Unit After JPCU 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
0 0 30 kg 
(1 seizure) 




Table 2.   Maritime Cocaine Seizures before and after JPCU67 
The JPCU program like Operation Westbridge was at the request of the 
Government of Ghana and leverages the expertise of international law enforcement while 
building on the foundation of existing domestic agencies.  Like Operation Westbridge 
this program has had a causal impact on Ghana’s interdiction success, but the data is less 
convincing. Prior to this program being put in place the only maritime narcotics 
interdiction recorded by Ghanaian authorities was 30 kilograms seized from the MV 
Benjamin in 2006.  Three seizures is certainly not enough to establish a long-term 
positive trend, especially since anecdotal evidence suggests drug trafficking organizations 
have recently changed their smuggling methods.  However, it does illustrate a further 
example of the absorptive capacity of the Ghanaian state of another international 
counternarcotics partnership. 
Beginning in 2009, judicial capacity building efforts through the U.S. State 
Department the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funded 
through the U.S. State Department instituted a program to put a prosecutor within the 
Ghanaian Ministry of Justice to assist with investigating and prosecuting cases to help 
improve the judicial system capacity.68   It is likely to improve the backlog of narcotics 
trafficking cases that has been a consistent shortfall. International agreements with the 
                                                 
 67 From three sources: 72 kilograms reported in UNODC Press Release, “UNODC Training Leads to 
Drugs Seizure at Ghanaian Port,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2009/May/2009-22-
05.html. (Accessed January 20, 2011); 154 kilogram seizure, September 1, 2009 reported in U.S. State 
Dept. INSCR 2010, 298;  130 kilograms reported by Gibbah G. Blay, “Big Cocaine Haul at Tema Port,” 
The Ghanaian Times, October 19, 2010 http://www.newtimes.com.gh/story/2475 (Accessed January 20, 
2011). 
68 The program is estimated to be funding at $330,000 through the INL.  See: United States 
Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2010, 301. 
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United States also resulted in the donation by the Department of Defense of two trace 
itemizers for detection of drug couriers at KIA.  The itemizers have been in use since 
January of 2010, and although it was not possible to determine how many of the 50 
seizures at KIA in 2010 were the result of this equipment, the Executive Secretary of 
NACOB asserted that their systematic use has acted as a deterrent to drug mules 
travelling through KIA.69  The Department of Defense also funded the construction of an 
evidence facility that was completed in September of 2010 and will be fully operational 
by February 2011.70  It is hoped that this facility will improve law enforcement’s capacity 
to conduct searches and secure evidence.  It is too early to tell at this point what these 
measure of capacity building have brought to the Ghanaian counternarcotics effort, but it 
indicates that the programs being implemented are targeting key weaknesses beyond 
simply interdicting the supply of drugs.    
Each of these international partnership arrangements has relied on the presence of 
adequately trained/committed personnel in Ghana, particularly in the law enforcement 
community to make these programs operational.  Ghana Police Services possesses basic 
law enforcement training capability through the Ghana Police College.71  Thus law 
enforcement has an adequate level of skill to engage successfully in these kinds of 
capacity building partnerships. In summary, the domestic narcotics interdiction rate 
versus those of Ghanaian origin interdicted elsewhere was the result of initial state 
capacity, which allowed for effective absorption of training, guidance and oversight 
provided by international partners. 
                                                 
69 Mark-Anthony Vinorko,  “Drug Trafficking Arrests Go Down,” The Daily Graphic (Ghana), July 
28, 2010. 
70 Peter D. Burgess, Strategy and Plans, Counternarcotics & Law Enforcement Assistance US 
AFRICOM, e-mail response to author’s inquiry, January 12, 2011. 
71 Ghana Police Services Website http://www.ghanapolice.info/college.htm. (Accessed March 7, 
2010). 
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This chapter will show that the low level of state capacity in Guinea-Bissau has 
been an obstacle to drug interdiction as well as to absorbing international assistance that 
might improve its performance.  No “war” on drugs has been waged in Guinea-Bissau 
because the state institutions responsible for mounting a counternarcotics strategy lack 
the institutional capacity to develop the skills, acquire the resources, and garnering the 
support necessary to build interdiction capacity.  As with the previous chapter, the 
following analysis considers both the impact of state capacity and external assistance on 
interdiction performance in Guinea-Bissau.  
A. NARCOTICS INTERDICTION GUINEA-BISSAU 
Although it is known that drugs were being trafficking through Guinea-Bissau as 
early as 2002–2003, drug interdictions known to be of Guinea-Bissau origin were first 
recorded in 2006, and the number of known origin interdictions remained low 
thereafter.72  The rate for 2006 is based on one drug seizure of 674 kilograms by the 
Bissau-Guinean Judicial Police, and two seizures in Europe (See Figure 2).  Despite the 
low number of seizures, it was widely believed that drugs were routinely being trafficked 
through Guinea-Bissau based on the number of Bissau-Guinean suspects caught 
elsewhere and law enforcement intelligence that traffickers were using Guinea-Bissau as 
a transshipment point. The small number of known cases of Bissau-Guinean origin is the 
result of geographic factors.  Guinea-Bissau is a very small country, with limited 
commercial airline traffic to Europe.  As a result, traffickers often move cocaine across 
the border into Guinea-Conakry or Senegal to board commercial flights, which make it 
difficult to definitively track the origin of the drugs.  A final factor is the lack of adequate 
                                                 
72 Senegalese authorities interdicted two large shipments of cannabis in 2002 and two large shipments 
of coca leaf bound for Guinea-Bissau in 2003. An average of 19 suspects of Bissau-Guinean origin were 
arrested for drug trafficking annually from 2003-2005.  The average number of suspects of Bissau-Guinean 
origin arrested annually increased to 43 per year from 2006-2010, indicating there was a growing quantity 
of drug trafficking through Guinea-Bissau, but the origin of these cases were not reported to the UNODC.  
It is not to known whether the suspects came through Guinea-Bissau or another transshipment point.  In the 
interests of consistency with the previous case study, this research only included cases where the known 
origin of the drug trafficking case was reported. 
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record keeping by Guinea-Bissau.  Based on law enforcement intelligence, the volume of 
drug trafficking through Guinea-Bissau is higher than the statistics indicate due to the 
limitations of the available drug seizure data. Much of the cocaine moving through 
Guinea-Bissau is likely to be recorded to be of Guinea-Conakry or Senegal origin.  This 
in turn means that the interdiction rate linked to Guinea-Bissau is likely understated, 
since European seizures of cocaine originating in Guinea-Bissau are likely to be divided 
among Bissau, Conakry, and Senegal in the database.  On the other hand, poor record 
keeping in Guinea-Bissau may lead to inaccurate reporting of domestic seizures, which 
could partially correct the bias in the other direction.73 On balance, despite these biases 
the data are likely to work validating my hypothesis. 
The domestic interdiction rate was 33% in 2006, and got worse thereafter. In  
2007, the Judicial Police made a single narcotics seizure of 635 kilograms of cocaine, 
which represented 7.7% of the 13 total cases known to have originated in Guinea-Bissau. 
Over the course of 2008–2010, 56 interdictions were made in Europe, and only one (a 
December 2010 seizure of 300 kilograms of cannabis) in Guinea-Bissau.74   
                                                 
73 The 2010 U.S. State Department INCSR notes “Due to weak enforcement efforts and inadequate 
record keeping, it is difficult even to assess the accurately the scope of the drug problem,” 313.  
74 “Guinea-Bissau: Marines Seize 300 Kilograms of Marijuana, Two Suspects Arrested,” Lusa, (In 
Portuguese), Accessed through OpenSource.gov 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display
/AFP20101209530002#index=1&searchKey=4594154&rpp=10. (Accessed February 21, 2011). 
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Figure 2.   Bissau-Guinean Drug Cases Seized Domestically Vs. Foreign75 
B. STATE CAPACITY 
Since 2005, Guinea-Bissau has scored 2.5 out of 6 on the World Bank’s Country 
Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating for Quality of Public 
Administration, significantly lower Ghana.76   A reflection of this low level of capacity if 
the fact that Bissau-Guinean law enforcement is severely resource constrained and lacks 
basic law enforcement equipment and training facilities. In fact, no domestic training 
                                                 
75 Comparison of known seizures of Bissau-Guinean origin made domestically vs. those reportedly 
made in foreign countries based on multiple reports from: United Nations Office for Drug Control and 
Crime Prevention, Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement Section, Bi-Annual Seizure Reports 2004/1 
through 2010/1: Summary of Individual Significant Seizures of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, as Reported by Governments, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004–2010. 
76 World Bank, CPIA Quality of Public Administration Rating, under data, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.PADM.XQ. (Accessed January 21, 2011). 
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facility exists in Guinea-Bissau.77  A senior law enforcement official with the UNODC 
characterized the Bissau-Guinean Public Order Police, who have primary responsibility 
for patrolling the country, as having “very low technical capacity and training.”78 The 
Judicial Police, who have primary responsibility for conducting counternarcotics 
operations, have approximately 180 officers, some of whom have received law 
enforcement training abroad, but they are hamstrung by having a limited number of 
vehicles dedicated to conducting counternarcotics operations and frequently do not have 
fuel to operate them.79  Remuneration has also been a constant problem within the law 
enforcement community in Guinea-Bissau with salaries frequently falling into arrears and 
requiring international assistance to make payroll.  From the capacity standpoint, law 
enforcement has been out-matched by its drug trafficking adversaries due to the inability 
of the state to provide the funding support and basic necessities of training, equipment 
and an adequate detention facility needed to carry out its counternarcotics duties.80  Low 
law enforcement capacity has had direct negative consequences on the state’s ability to 
interdict narcotics. 
Even the interdiction success, the two large drug seizures reported by the Judicial 
Police in 2006 and 2007, illustrate the extremely limited institutional capabilities of the 
Guinea-Bissau state.  In the first case, the Judicial Police, acted on intelligence from 
Interpol, seized 674 kilograms of cocaine and arrested two Columbian suspects that had 
arrived by plane to a military airstrip in September 2006, taking the drugs and suspects 
                                                 
77 Brazil has promised to fund the construction of a police academy, but as of now Guinea-Bissau does 
not have a domestic training facility.  The training that is provided is primarily carried out in Brazil, 
Portugal and Cape Verde.  See, “Guinea-Bissau: UNODC to Support Set-up of Police Academy” 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/January/guinea-bissau_-unodc-to-build-a-police-
academy.html. (Accessed February 22, 2011). 
78 Flemming Quist, Interview, September 8, 2010. 
79 A UNODC, report noted the Judicial Police had one vehicle as of 2007; see Drug Trafficking as a 
Security Threat in West Africa, 36.  James Traub noted that the French government recently donated three 
vehicles; see “Africa's Drug Problem.” New York Times Magazine, April 9, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/11Trade-t.html?pagewanted=all. (Accessed February 22, 
2011); Flemming Quist noted that 5 Toyota Land Cruisers and 10 motorcycles were procured in February 
2009. 
80 U.S. State Dept., Human Rights Report 2008. 
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into custody.81   In the second case, in April 2007, the Judicial Police seized 635 
kilograms of cocaine in the last vehicle of a four-vehicle convoy that had just off-loaded 
a major shipment of cocaine from an aircraft at a military landing strip, taking two 
Columbian suspects and two Bissau-Guinean military officers into custody.82  In the 
2006 case, the Judicial Police facility where the suspects and cocaine were being held 
was surrounded by heavily armed military officers, who took custody of the cocaine, 
ostensibly to transport it to a safe in the Ministry of Finance.83  The drugs later 
disappeared from the Interior Ministry facility and the two the Columbian suspects were 
released on bail and fled the country. To this point, this case is similar to the MV 
Benjamin case in Ghana in which a large quantity of drugs went missing.   However, the 
follow up diverges dramatically. Bissau-Guinean Law enforcement officials and 
Ministers were implicated, but no charges were brought.84  The Ministry of Justice 
provided no legal reason for releasing the Columbian suspects, who never stood trial, and 
simply called their flight “regrettable.”85  All state institutions involved demonstrated 
insufficient capacity to perform basic functions beyond the initial arrest of the suspects.   
In the second case, in 2007, the Judicial Police arrested two Columbian suspects 
affiliated with the FARC and two Guinea-Bissau military officers, and were able to retain 
possession of the evidence.86   However, the other three vehicles in the convoy, estimated 
to be carrying two tons of cocaine, escaped because “the Judicial Police did not have 
vehicles to give chase”87 As with the previous case, the Columbian suspects were 
released on bail, while the two military officers were turned over to military jurisdiction. 
                                                 
81 UNODC, “Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (With 
Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau), 15. 
82 Flemming Quist, Interview with author. 
83 “Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability,” 15. 
84 Human Rights Report 2008: Guinea-Bissau, U.S. State Department, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119006.htm.  (Accessed February 24, 2011). 
85 UNODC, “Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (With 
Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau). 
86 Stephen Ellis,  “West Africa’s International Drug Trade” African Affairs, 108, no. 431, (2009), 192. 
87 UNODC, “Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (With 
Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau), 15; Joseph Winter, Africa New Front in Drugs War, BBC online, 9 
July 07, (Accessed Decemb er 12, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6274590.stm. 
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Once again, all suspects were released with no justification, suggesting that authorities 
were threatened and/or paid off and again demonstrating very low levels of institutional 
capacity to successfully carry a case from arrest to prosecution.  Despite the high profile 
nature of this case and the inexplicable release of the suspects the government of Guinea-
Bissau did not launch a formal inquiry.  It is known, however, that the head of the 
Judicial Police, Orlando Antonio da Silva, attempted to investigate the case, and was met 
with death threats, reprimanded by Interior Minister Baciro Dabo, and ultimately fired 
from his post.88   
More generally, Bissau-Guinean Judge André Lima reported that the “military has 
impunity and we have no protection” when it comes to prosecuting narcotics cases.89  
Even in the most high profile narcotics cases, the Bissau-Guinean state is unable to 
uphold the rule of law.  Judges and prosecutors are poorly paid and trained, lack  
protection from threats and are highly susceptible to corruption.90 Between 2005 and 
2009 there is no record of drug trafficking cases that were successfully prosecuted.91  The 
utter lack of state capacity from arrest to prosecution and imprisonment has had a 
negative impact on the ability interdict narcotics.   
C. INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS 
International partnerships have played a marginal role in counternarcotics 
operations in Guinea-Bissau.  The fundamental lack of state capacity has constrained the 
ability to absorb the programs that have gotten off the ground, and they have not made a 
positive impact on interdiction. International assistance programs are hampered not only 
by the low level of state capacity, but also the pervasive atmosphere of political 
                                                 
88 Stephen Ellis,  “West Africa’s International Drug Trade,” 192. 
89 UNODC, “Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development (With 
Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau), 15; Joseph Winter, Africa New Front in Drugs War, BBC online, 9 
July 07, (Accessed December 12, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6274590.stm. 
90 2008 Human Rights Report: Guinea-Bissau, U.S. State Department.  
91 “Background Paper on Drug Trafficking in Guinea-Bissau,” UN Peacebuilding Commission 
Country-Specific Configuration on Guinea-Bissau, Thematic Discussion on Drug Trafficking in Guinea-
Bissau and Strengthening of the Justice Sector, May 28, 2008, 2; U.S. State Department INCSR 2010; 
Testimony by Assistant Secretary of African Affairs, Johnnie Carson before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee, June 23, 2009.  No data for 2010 arrests/prosecutions is available. 
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instability present in Guinea-Bissau that has strained the ability to form partnerships.  It 
must be noted, however, that there are limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn 
about the impact of international partnerships on interdiction, in Guinea-Bissau due to the 
nature of the partnerships, the timing, and the conditions under which they operate.  
Nevertheless, there have been several important international partnerships in Guinea-
Bissau that have been aimed at getting law enforcement, judicial capacity and detention 
facilities to an acceptable level.  These partnerships have taken the form of: law 
enforcement and judicial training provided by Portugal, Italy and Brazil with the support 
of the UNODC, establishment of a specialized counternarcotics unit within the Judicial 
Police, the prison rehabilitation and a justice administration projects and the West 
African Coast Initiative.92 
The government of Portugal, through its institute for development assistance 
(IPAD) has consistently been the largest single contributors to capacity building efforts 
within the security and judicial sectors in Guinea-Bissau.93  For example, from 2006–
2009 Portugal has provided fourteen different programs to strengthen judicial capacity 
including: training courses for magistrates at multiple levels within the judicial system, a 
program to improve legal education, training to improve the technical and investigative 
capacity of the supreme court and a program to improve the overall operation of the 
judicial system.94   Portugal also worked extensively to provide advanced training to 
police forces over the course of 2006–2009 and has consistently engaged in law 
enforcement capacity building despite the political and military instability in Guinea-
                                                 
92 Twentieth Meeting of Heads of National Drug Law Enforcement Agencies, “Current Situation with 
Respect to Sub regional and Regional Cooperation in Countering Drug Trafficking,” Conference Report, 
Nairobi, September 13-17, 2010, 1–7. 
93 Portugal has been the single largest contributor of developmental assistance over the period 2006-
2009, according to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, found under 
StatExtracts, Guinea-Bissau, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=CRSNEW (Accessed March 8, 
2011). 
94 Portugal has contributed approximately $1.5 million for programs to strengthen the judicial branch 
over the period 2006–2009. OECD, Statistics. 
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Bissau.95  Portugal along with other partner countries also assisted the Government of 
Guinea-Bissau in developing a counternarcotics operations plan.   
Beginning at the end of 2007 , the UNODC launched a three part program aimed 
at building law enforcement training capacity, creating a special counternarcotics unit, 
and the construction of the country’s first police academy.  The first two phases are 
complete and a thirty person counternarcotics unit within the Judicial Police that 
specializes in combating drug trafficking and organized crime was established beginning 
in April 2008.  In January 2010, the third phase of the program was kicked off with the 
announcement of a three year construction plan for a 30,000 square foot law enforcement 
training at a projected cost of $3 million to be funded by the Brazilian Agency for 
Cooperation.96  In the meantime the government of Brazil  has been providing advanced 
law enforcement training at its Brazilian Police Academy since 2008.  As of May 2010,  
seventy-five Guinea-Bissau Judicial Police or approximately half of its force has received 
advanced law enforcement and management training in anticipation of taking on 
responsibility for their own police academy.97 
Guinea-Bissau joined the West African Coast Initiative (WACI) by signing the 
Freetown Commitment in  February 2010, as a measure to implement the 
recommendations of the ECOWAS Regional Response Action Plan for counternarcotics. 
The primary goal of the WACI is to establish a collaborative interagency approach to law 
enforcement and intelligence gathering to counteract drug trafficking and other forms of 
organized crime. Guinea-Bissau along with the other WACI countries: Côte d’Ivoire, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau are each tasked with  developing a 
Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) to coordinate with the other member countries in 
                                                 
95 Portugal has contributed approximately $2.5 million for law enforcement capacity building efforts. 
OECD, Statistics. 
96 “Guinea-Bissau: UNODC To Support Set Up Of Police Academy,”  UNODC Press Release, 
January 22, 2010, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/January/guinea-bissau_-unodc-to-build-
a-police-academy.html. (Accessed February 28, 2011). 
97 So far 75 Bissau-Guinean Judicial Police have been trained in Brazil as part of law enforcement 
institutional capacity building efforts.  See: “International Cooperation: Brazil Trains Officers Who Will 




fighting organized crime.  Guinea-Bissau’s WACI management board met for the first 
time in February 2011 and the TCU only exists on paper at this point.  For obvious 
reasons, this program has yet to yield results because it has yet to get off the ground.  
Two refurbished prisons were opened in September 22, 2010, in Mansoa and 
Bafata as a result of a UNODC sponsored partnership with the Justice Ministry.98 This 
will bring the formal prison capacity for the country to 180 prisoners. Two more prisons 
rebuild projects are planned for the future in Bissau and Cachungo.  The problem, 
however, is there is not yet a cadre of trained prison guards, which is a program that is 
anticipated in the future with the support of the UNODC.  The prisons are certainly a 
worthwhile capacity building effort but it does not remedy the profound problems with 
other crucial elements of capacity such as establishing a functioning judicial system that 
can operate impartially and free from coercion. The UNODC has installed Manuel 
Pereira as legal advisor within the Ministry of Justice in Guinea Bissau, but it is too early 
to tell if this will yield results.  These measures are certainly warranted in Guinea-Bissau, 
but they will only prove fruitful if Guinea-Bissau has the capacity to arrest narcotics 
trafficking suspects, which it apparently is still lacking.  
The international partnership that has been in place over the long-term has 
primarily been the effort of Portugal and though these assistance programs have 
attempted to build capacity by improving law enforcement training, developing 
counternarcotics operational plans and strengthening the judicial branch, they have not 
resulted in a discernable difference in the level of interdiction in Guinea-Bissau.  
Furthermore, the training the Judicial Police has received in Brazil and the creation of a 
special counternarcotics unit within the JP have not led to any reported narcotics 
interdictions. Despite receiving international law enforcement assistance from Portugal in 
from 2006-2009, the domestic interdiction rate dropped rather than increased. This leads 
to the conclusion that the low level of state capacity has inhibited the absorption of 
international assistance and in turn has a negative impact on interdiction.   
                                                 
98 “Guinea-Bissau: Two New Prisons to Be Opened on 22 September,” Lusa, September 20, 2010. 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display
/AFP20100921503003#index=1&searchKey=4634814&rpp=10. (Accessed February 26, 2011). 
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As mentioned at the outset, however, there are several problems to applying this 
causal logic broadly to all the international law enforcement assistance.  The first is the 
nature of the assistance that is being provided to Guinea-Bissau.  Since the country lacks 
its own law enforcement training facilities it stands to reason that most of the training and 
technical assistance is designed to provide law enforcement with the basic level of 
training and equipment necessary to carry out its functions.  There has been some training 
specifically geared towards carrying out counternarcotics operations, but they have not 
made a difference in interdiction.  A second problem is that the programs designed to 
improve the judicial branch and detention facilities have only an ancillary effect on 
interdiction in the respect that each component is necessary to prosecute and imprison a 
drug trafficker, but do not directly lead to interdiction success.  A third problem is the 
timing of several of the programs such as the WACI Transnational Crime Units and the 
national police academy that are still in the developmental stage.  Only time will tell if 
state capacity will be adequate to absorb these programs and ultimately play a positive 
role in narcotics interdiction efforts.  A final problem is that we cannot assess what would 
have happened to interdiction if more robust hands-on partnerships like Operation 
Westbridge and JPCU had been attempted in Guinea-Bissau.  There are so many pieces 
to the counternarcotics puzzle that are deficient in Guinea-Bissau it is unlikely that these 
more robust programs would be possible given the fact that each program relies on a 
modicum state capacity and stability that are not present in Guinea-Bissau 
In summary, the lack of interdiction success rate (DV) is the result of a low level 
of state capacity (IV) at multiple levels in Guinea-Bissau.  The caveats above, 
notwithstanding, the long-term international effort by the Portuguese to assist in law 
enforcement capacity building have not resulted in noticeable improvements in 
interdiction.  Guinea-Bissau, is, in fact, caught in an incapacity trap where the crucial 
pieces in the counternarcotics puzzle are operating at a low level, which is a reflection of 
the low level of state capacity. 
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IV. CONCLUSION  AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
On the surface, the portrait of Ghana and Guinea-Bissau as havens for narcotics 
trafficking appears similar because each country is geographically situated in a location 
that is favorable to transshipment of cocaine to the European market.  Each has a 
coastline that has little or no systematic maritime counternarcotics interdiction capability 
and each has a network of organized criminal activity that supports narcotics trafficking. 
The purpose of this research has been to look beyond these similarities.  First, to explain 
the variations in the (DV) interdiction rates in terms of the causal impact of the (IV) of 
state capacity.  Second to assess international partnerships as a potential intervening 
variable in interdiction success. 
This research has shown that the two countries have had different interdiction 
outcomes that can be explained by variations in the level of state capacity.  Beginning in 
2005, in Ghana, one begins to see a shift in interdiction patterns with the number of cases 
resolved domestically increasing against those resolved on foreign soil indicating a 
higher interdiction success rate.  With the exception of 2007 the trend of was consistent 
from 2005-2010.  In Guinea-Bissau law enforcement initially made two large drug 
seizures in 2006 and 2007 and then there was an absence of any successful drug seizures 
on the part of Bissau-Guinean authorities until one small, non-cocaine seizure in 2010.  
Meanwhile the number of cases that originated in Guinea-Bissau that were interdicted 
elsewhere increased dramatically.  
By analyzing these cases comparatively trends emerge about the state capacity of 
Ghana versus Guinea-Bissau that has had an impact on interdiction.  As was expected the 
higher level of state capacity in Ghana led to higher domestic narcotic interdiction rates 
whereas low state capacity led to a lower rate in Guinea-Bissau.  There was a higher 
degree of accountability and rule of law in Ghana, in particular, by comparison to 
Guinea-Bissau.  The MV Benjamin case in Ghana and the first large drug seizure in 
Guinea-Bissau both occurred in 2006 during what counternarcotics experts assert was the 
peak of trafficking through the region.  These cases provide insight into the dynamics of 
interdiction and state capacity, particularly from the perspective of accountability.  Both 
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cases had problematic outcomes with the disappearance of large quantities of cocaine and 
the involvement of law enforcement or military officials. In the wake of the MV 
Benjamin scandal Ghanaian officials were held accountable whereas in Guinea-Bissau no 
discernable efforts were made to puts its house in order. Unlike Ghana where a public 
commission led by a Supreme Court justice was convened to investigate the case, in 
Guinea-Bissau coercion and eventually the firing of the official who attempted to 
investigate, thwarted efforts to bring closure to the case.  Furthermore, the follow-on 
actions in Ghana that included investigations and prosecutions of officers involved in 
drug trafficking suggests that it has the capacity to impose sanctions on those within their 
own ranks that is not present in Guinea-Bissau.  
By comparison to Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, has severe shortfalls in accountability 
and rule of law that go far beyond this initial case in 2006.  Unlike Ghana’s record of 
prosecuting an average of 40 drug trafficking cases annually since 2001, there is no 
record of successful cases of drug trafficking that were carried from arrest to prosecution 
and imprisonment during the period 2005-2009.  In fact, judicial capacity is indicative of 
capacity problems that exist at every level of this process in Guinea-Bissau.  Unlike 
Ghana where a domestic police academy is established, the Bissau-Guinean Judicial 
Police and Public Order Police do not have a domestic training capacity and must rely on 
external support from Portugal, Brazil and the UNODC to provide basic law enforcement 
training.   This has severely limited the degree to which Guinea-Bissau can build law 
enforcement capacity domestically.  Though Ghana’s law enforcement training capacity 
lacks the facilities to absorb its projected recruits under its five-year plan and lacks a 
criminal investigation division training facility, its law enforcement community has the 
basic building blocks in place to expand to meet its goals if the financial resources are 
available. 
Both countries are resource constrained from the law enforcement perspective, 
and have shortfalls in equipment, which is characteristic of many of the West African 
countries confronting drug trafficking.  Taken at face value this factor does not seem to 
have explanatory power because it is pervasive in both countries and many others in the 
region.  The difference, however, is the severe degree to which Guinea-Bissau is resource 
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constrained.  The Government of Guinea-Bissau lacks the capacity to provide the basic 
necessities of law enforcement equipment such as vehicles, fuel and the ability to 
regularly pay its police forces on its own.  Compounding the problem is the fact that even 
if law enforcement had the capability to arrest a suspect, find an impartial prosecutor free 
from threats and coercion and convict an offender, there was no prison facility capable of 
housing an inmate until late 2010.   The extremely low level of capacity at multiple levels 
has had a negative impact on interdiction in Guinea-Bissau that is not present to the same 
degree in Ghana. 
A comparative analysis of the capacity of the state to absorb international 
partnerships and assistance revealed that in the case of Ghana, the state was able absorb 
several international assistance programs involving training, technical assistance, 
equipment and two major programs: Operation Westbridge and the JPCU.  The results for 
Ghana showed that there were discernable improvements in interdiction as a result of the 
capacity of the state to absorb these programs and work successfully with international 
partners.  Guinea-Bissau was less successful applying international assistance in the form 
of law enforcement training and judicial and detention facility reform, but the evidence is 
much less conclusive that there is a causal link between the state capacity to absorb 
international assistance and lack of interdiction.  In Ghana, there were quantifiable 
increases in interdiction after receiving drug atomizer equipment and training through the 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) in 2003-
2004.  Similarly there was a noticeable increase in interdiction at Kotoka International 
Airport after Operation Westbridge was put in place.  The Joint Port Control Unit has 
also proven to be somewhat effective at interdiction in the port of Tema, though there 
have been a limited number of seizures since the program kicked off.    
By comparison Guinea-Bissau has received law enforcement and judicial system 
training from Portugal throughout the period of study and has not shown an increase in 
narcotics interdiction.  The other international partnerships such as the UNODC project 
to create a special counternarcotics unit, the West African Coast Initiative and the 
UNODC prison and judicial reform projects have only come online recently.   The causal 
claim that the inability of the Government of Guinea-Bissau to absorb these programs as 
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an intervening factor is not, however, fully supported by the evidence.  One would expect 
that the training programs provided by Portugal and Brazil to train Judicial Police would 
lead to higher levels of interdiction, but so far it has not yielded quantifiable results.  On 
the other hand, it must be noted that Guinea-Bissau has not received the same type of 
long-term assistance specifically aimed at counternarcotics that one sees in Ghana, like 
Operation Westbridge and the JPCU that is built upon a pre-existing foundation of 
domestic law enforcement capacity.  Although some programs are specifically aimed at 
counternarcotics the majority of the programs in Guinea-Bissau are aimed at fundamental 
capacity building blocks such as a providing the police force with the basic tools and 
training to patrol the country and assisting with judicial reforms and a means to detain 
criminals.  The impact of international assistance has also been impeded by the  unstable 
political/military situation in Guinea-Bissau during the period of study that was not 
present in Ghana.  
The extremely problematic situation between the senior military and political 
leaders in Guinea-Bissau is an additional factor that speaks to capacity and has impeded 
interdiction success. In March 2009 President Nino Vieira and General Batista Tagmé Na 
Waié were assassinated and over two years later the perpetrators have not been brought to 
justice.   Additionally, the events of April 1, 2010 involving a mutiny by senior military 
officers underscore a fundamental lack of state capacity to maintain stability, a system of 
checks and balances and respect for the rule of law.  The inability of the state to build 
counternarcotics interdiction capacity is, in fact, a reflection of the weakness and lack of 
capacity at the highest echelons of the government of Guinea-Bissau.  In the aftermath of 
the events of April 1, 2010, the ringleader of the mutiny, General Antonio Injai assumed 
the position of Army Chief of Staff with the blessing of President Sanhá.  Furthermore, 
the reinstatement of former Navy Chief of Staff, José Americo Bubo Na Tchuto and 
Ibraima Papa Camara as Air Force Chief of Staff, both of whom are drug kingpins 
according to U.S. Department of Treasury, were returned the country to the status quo as 
far as drug trafficking.99  These events reflect a lack of capacity of the state to hold senior 
officials accountable.  These events illustrate that the country has not moved “beyond the 
                                                 
99 “Treasury Designates Two Narcotics Traffickers in Guinea-Bissau.” 
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rule of the gun,” and it has put an end to EU sponsored SSR that could have improved the 
situation.100  This also calls into question whether capacity building efforts through 
external partners will have success moving forward given the atmosphere of impunity 
that the military is operating in.  
In keeping with the focus of the questions asked at the outset of this research 
about variations in interdiction, what lessons can be learned and how this research relates 
to the debates brought up in the literature discussed in Chapter I, there are several 
conclusions that can be made.  The first is that a relatively high level of state capacity is a 
crucial element that must be present as an enabler to mounting an effective 
counternarcotics interdiction strategy. Clearly there are wide discrepancies in state 
capacity between the two countries researched as illustrated by the different CPIA public 
administration ratings as well as the anecdotal evidence related to specific cases and 
elements of capacity.  These factors must be taken into account by policymakers 
attempting to create and implement counternarcotics strategies.  A one-size fits all 
approach to interdiction will not apply equally well to all countries in West Africa.  Some 
countries like Ghana have proven to be a more viable partner in the “War on Drugs” in 
West Africa than Guinea-Bissau, despite the fact that both share similar geographic 
challenges, problems with corruption and resource constraints.  Policymakers should take 
into account that counternarcotics investments in a country that lacks state capacity is 
unlikely to yield positive results and may, in fact, create a perverse incentive for those 
countries that lack capacity to do little to deter drug trafficking in an attempt to garner 
assistance.  Strategists and policymakers should take into account that a much higher 
level of hands-on assistance and mentorship that goes far beyond counternarcotics is 
required for countries like Guinea-Bissau and this can only succeed in an environment of 
political and military stability.  
The second conclusion in keeping with the debate in the literature is the assertion 
that interdiction of drugs will not “win” the War on Drugs in a way that will eliminate 
narcotics from the trafficking pipeline, but will merely shift drug trafficking patterns and 
                                                 
100 Guinea-Bissau: Beyond Rule of the Gun,” Crisis Group Africa Briefing, International Crisis 
Group, no. 61, (June 25, 2009), 1. 
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concealment methods.  There is merit to this argument, as drugs have continued to flow 
through West Africa to the European consumer market through both countries researched 
in this study despite efforts at interdiction.  The balloon effect is certainly a factor in 
West Africa where applying an interdiction solution to the problem may merely squeeze 
the balloon and shift the drug trafficking to other countries within the region that have 
lower capacity to  counteract the problem.  The goal of interdiction as a pillar of a 
counternarcotics strategy in West Africa, however, needs to be seen as a tool to  be used 
as a deterrent to criminal organizations and as a means to mitigate the impact of narcotics 
trafficking on the rates of violent crime, state security, and economic impacts.  The states 
that are the most adept at mitigating these impacts are those that have a high enough 
degree of state capacity to pursue a comprehensive counternarcotics strategy that includes 
the ability to work with international partners.  
In keeping with another theme of the literature, it must be noted that interdiction 
is only one part of the solution. While demand-reduction solutions have not been the 
focus of this research, policymakers must consider this element because it represents a 
second front in the “Drug War” and it is one that is largely out of the control of the West 
African states dealing with problems of narcotics trafficking.  Though there is growing 
concern over local consumption of cocaine in West African countries the primary 
consumers of cocaine trafficked through West Africa are Europeans.  Therefore, 
policymakers must consider that looking beyond the reasons such as overall state 
weakness, porous borders and lack of capacity in West Africa, one of the primary driving 
factors for why cocaine is being transshipped through the region is the burgeoning 
European demand for cocaine.   Interdiction is certainly a key component to mitigating 
the problem in West Africa, but it will not solve the problem of the growing demand. 
More specifically to problem at hand in Ghana, the international community 
needs to realize that Ghana appears to be doing well in counternarcotics relative to its  
regional counterparts, in part, because so few countries in West Africa have shown a 
long-term pattern of success.  The greatest area for improvement in narcotics interdiction 
for Ghana like many of its West African counterparts is in the maritime domain where 
the bulk of the cocaine is coming ashore in the country and the borders where much of 
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the cocaine is leaving the country.  The JPCU set up by the UN and the World Customs 
Organization has proven to be a worthwhile endeavor in interdicting shipments of 
cocaine and other contraband one it reaches the port of Tema, but it leaves the majority of 
Ghana’s 335 mile coastline susceptible to traffickers who have a wealth of options for 
getting cocaine on shore elsewhere. Many of Ghana’s counterparts are faced with the 
similar problem of the need to expand maritime and border counternarcotics operations.  
It remains to be seen if Ghana and international partners will enter into arrangements to 
tackle these areas because of the magnitude of manpower and resources needed to set up 
comprehensive counternarcotics operations for these domains. 
The Republic of Guinea-Bissau will not be able to make progress in combating 
drug trafficking  in the near-term. Aid or some form of international support in Guinea-
Bissau appears to be necessary, but it is creating a perverse incentive, or a form of 
counternarcotics aid “rent” for the government of Guinea-Bissau.  The country’s 
continuing instability and its role as a safe haven for drug trafficking bolsters the 
perception that more attention and potentially more aid is warranted.  The appointments 
of  José Americo “Bubo” Na Tchuto, Ibraima “Papa” Camara, and Antonio Indjai  to 
senior military positions despite their dubious pasts were not simply moves of 
appeasement on the part of the civilian leaders towards their much stronger and 
dangerous military counterparts.  These moves were aimed at eliciting a response form 
the international community, attention and ultimately aid to combat drug trafficking.  
However it has undermined the country’s reputation as a viable partner in the war on 
drugs. 
International assistance appears to be a necessity in both countries, but major 
problems remain unresolved in Guinea-Bissau.  The first problem, is whether or not aid 
can be applied effectively in Guinea-Bissau when so many elements of state capacity are 
deficient.  The country has shown an inability to deliver basic public goods, enforce the 
rule of law and lacks control over its oversized military that operates in an environment 
of impunity.  In the absence of an effective reform of the military in Guinea-Bissau, it 
remains debatable as to whether expanding aid toward counternarcotics programs will be 
successful given the atmosphere of impunity that the military operates in the country.  
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The second problem is, given the recurrent political instability in Guinea-Bissau; the 
international community will find it difficult to find “a credible set of actors and 
institutions with which to work.”101  
Bolstering law enforcement capacity, equipment, training, penal and judicial 
system is necessary.  However, it will not be enough to correct the underlying problems 
of state weakness. External assistance should be aimed at fundamental capacity building 
in the tools of good governance and enforcing the rule of law, first  along with security 
sector reform to reduce and professionalize the military.  The U.N. Security Council has 
recognized this and renewed the mandate for the United Nations Integrated Peace 
building Office in Guinea-Bissau under resolution 1949 (2010) through December 2011.  
Among the many parts of this resolution it stresses, “the continued support of the United 
Nations and the international community for the long-term security and development of 
Guinea-Bissau, particularly in the fields of security sector reform, justice and in building 
the capacity of the government to tackle illicit drug trafficking.”102  The EU, for its part 
has ended its SSR program due to the instability after the attempted coup, April 1, 2010. 
From the perspective of mitigating the impact of narcotics in Guinea-Bissau, it is 
a much better option in the near-term to ramp up maritime interdiction operations with 
reliable and trustworthy international partners who are equipped to do maritime 
counternarcotics operations and do not face the same challenges as Guinea-Bissau.  The 
challenge with this option is that there is very little maritime capacity in the region 
beyond a few countries and a great deal of coastline to cover.  This also does not solve 
the problem with aircraft using remote airstrips as a means to traffic drugs into the 
country. Another option is to continue to strengthen counternarcotics operations nearby 
with countries in the region that are already demonstrating the will and capacity to tackle 
the problem such as Cape Verde and look into the possibility of increasing the role of its 
ECOWAS peers as a form of mentorship in countering narcotics. 
                                                 
101 Mathew V. Sousa, interviewed by author. 
102 “Security Council Renews Mandate of United Nations Integrated Peace building Office: In 
Guinea-Bissau Until December 31, 2011, Concerned at Persistent Instability,” UN Security Council Press 
Release, 6428th Security Council Meeting, 23 Nov 10. 
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A program along the lines of Operation Westbridge through a bi-lateral 
arrangement with the UK should be avoided in Guinea-Bissau for several reasons.  The 
bulk of the cocaine flowing into and out of Guinea-Bissau is not arriving by commercial 
airliner via Bissau. Guinea-Bissau offers a variety of trafficking options that are difficult 
to counteract,  a relatively long unpatrolled coastline with 80+ islands that are not 
policed, remote landing strips, porous borders with its neighbors and a government that 
lacks the basic level of law enforcement capacity to counteract trafficking through any of 
these domains.  A program like Westbridge would only target the relatively small amount 
of air traffic from Osvaldo Vieira International Airport to Portugal, Senegal, Guinea and 
Cape Verde.  In short, attempting to interdict narcotics in Guinea-Bissau is fighting an 
uphill battle and the government is not providing any high ground in the fight.  As 
counternarcotics expert Peter Burgess summed it up, “Guinea-Bissau is simply faced with 
a perfect storm of an ideal geography and location for smugglers, a desperately poor 
country and sufficient corruption to dishearten most international organizations.” 103 
There are limits to what kind of assistance the U.S. can give to Guinea-Bissau, 
and it remains a low priority.  United States policymakers are more interested in the 
threat of transnational terrorism than drug trafficking.  Although there’s a growing 
concern that trafficking activities in West Africa are supporting groups like AQIM, the 
threat is not taken seriously enough.  Despite the risk of a drug trafficking organization 
linking to terrorist organizations, it is unlikely that the U.S. will engage in long-term 
counternarcotics assistance programs in Guinea-Bissau until they emerge as a trusted 
partner, the country exhibits a track record of political and military stability and  re-
establish respect for the rule of law.  Ultimately, the member countries of the CPLP, 
ECOWAS and the UNODC and its partner nations will need to burden a great deal of 
responsibility for providing technical assistance and training for law enforcement, as they 
have in the past, but it is doubtful that a law enforcement approach alone will bring about 
successful interdiction programs with all the capacity problems with which Guinea-
Bissau and many countries in the region are contending.   
                                                 
103 Peter D. Burgess, Strategy and Plans, Counternarcotics & Law Enforcement Assistance US 
AFRICOM, Interviewed by author. 
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